

VZCZCXRO3608
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #3165/01 2410630
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 290630Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6542
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003165

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/28/2011
TAGS: [PGOV](#) [ECON](#) [EPET](#) [MARR](#) [IZ](#)
SUBJECT: NINEWA: IND: COALITION FORCES NOW ESSENTIAL AND
NATIONAL UNITY CANNOT BE FURTHER COMPROMISED

Classified By: NInewa PRT Leader James Knight: Reasons 1.4(b) and (d).
This is a Ninewa Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) message.

SUMMARY

¶1. (C) PRT Team Leader Knight and IPAO Pope met Ninewa's Iraqi National Dialogue (IND) spokesman and Deputy Chair Mosaddaq al-Chalabi at PRT headquarters on FOB Marez 19 August 2006. Chalabi added little to well-known IND positions -- including the party's disapproval of Ninewa's current leadership -- except to emphasize that IND now believes that premature withdrawal of Coalition forces will lead to quote chaos unquote, and that Coalition forces should begin gradual withdrawal only when Iraqis security forces can fully assume national security responsibilities. IND has accepted autonomy for the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) with reluctance, but remains stridently opposed to similar autonomy for other (presumably Sunni and Shi'a) regions. End Summary.

----- --
A Bash for Kashmoula and the Provincial Council
----- --

¶2. (C) In response to Team Leader Knight's opening query about IND's current priorities, Chalabi confined policy remarks to paraphrases from an IND manifesto and a notebook of prepared statements. He pointed to IND's hopes to establish a capitalistic economic system inspired by the U.S., but with greater social justice -- defined by Chalabi as greater economic equality. Similarly, he emphasized that IND hopes for a tolerant, democratic Iraq, but one in which national Islamic identity and values are given priority.

¶3. (C) Chalabi strongly criticized Ninewa Province's current leadership. He emphasized that Ninewa's Provincial Council is dominated by Kurds -- who are a minority in Ninewa -- and thus not representative. He insisted that Ninewa Governor Kashmoula is incapable of governing effectively -- Kashmoula continues to make empty promises to improve the economy and obtain sufficient fuel for the province, and has accordingly lost the confidence of Ninewa's people.

¶4. (C) Chalabi then asserted that increasing violence in Mosul arises from the desperate situation of its residents. There is no fuel for cooking or vehicles; no potable water; unreliable,

inadequate electrical service; and a broken sewage system. Unemployment is above 60 per cent, and most families lack income to meet basic needs. The Ninewa's provincial government has not resolved these problems. Frustration among the city's residents provides perfect conditions for terrorists to elicit support against the Coalition and the GOI. Chalabi underscored repeatedly that only urgent measures that effectively address Mosul's economic problems can bring peace.

KRG autonomy acceptable . . .

15. (C) Responding to a Team Leader query, Chalabi recounted that IND opposed the Constitution adopted last year because IND did not concur with allowing autonomous regional governments -- the party opposes breaking Iraq into regional 'states', and does not support an independent Kurdistan. However, Chalabi agreed that the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) as currently established is appropriate, and added that IND supports national resolution of Kurd territorial claims and the future of Kirkuk.

. . . but not elsewhere

16. (C) However, Chalabi forcefully rejected suggestions that a model similar to that established by the KRG could be implemented for Iraq's Sunni and Shi'a. Chalabi was unable to explain why IND was

BAGHDAD 00003165 002 OF 002

willing to accept KRG autonomy but rejected such arrangements except for Kurds.

Coalition forces must remain for now

17. (C) When asked by Team Leader Knight to detail IND views on Coalition forces, Chalabi pointed out that that IND leaders formerly called for speedy withdrawal of Coalition forces on a clear timetable. However, IND now believes that Coalition forces are essential to control growing violence which IND believes is precipitated by Ba'athists, foreign fighters, and criminals. Early withdrawal of Coalition forces will lead to an explosion of violence, and 'chaos' will follow. Gradual withdrawal of Coalition forces should begin when Iraqi security forces are capable of dealing with the violence without Coalition support.

COMMENT

18. (C) During this meeting, Chalabi was much like a spokesman caught without updated talking points, especially when queried on issues not addressed in his prepared notes or the IND's handbook (the handbook, printed in June 2006, is titled 'Arab Iraqi Party for National Dialogue -- Theoretical Approaches and the Internal System'; our translation is underway). In particular, sectarian violence in Baghdad, ongoing anti-GOI and anti-Coalition violence in Mosul, and the emergence of the KRG as an apparently irreversibly autonomous region appear to have left the IND struggling for a coherent message -- which Chalabi covered by rote tub-thumping.

19. (C) Comment continued. Despite his bombast,

Chalabi's concern that economic distress drives violence in Mosul is widely held along Mosul's diverse political spectrum. In particular, unending fuel shortages are a sharp driver of discontent. Mosul's motorists endure daylong waits for gas in miles-long queues, and the limited fuel thus available means that private generators -- the only recourse to meet power needs in the absence of a reliable grid -- usually stand idle. End comment.
SPECKHARD